Abstract-Steganography is about how to send secret message covertly. And the purpose of steganalysis is to not only detect the existence of the hidden message but also extract it. So far there have been many reliable detecting methods on various steganographic algorithms, while there are few approaches that can extract the hidden information. In this paper, the difficulty of extracting hidden information, which is essentially a kind of privacy, is analyzed with information-theoretic method in the terms of unicity distance of steganographic key (abbreviated stego key). A lower bound for the unicity distance is obtained, which shows the relations between key rate, message rate, hiding capacity and difficulty of extraction. Furthermore the extracting attack to steganography is viewed as a special kind of cryptanalysis, and an effective method on recovering the stego key of popular LSB replacing steganography in spatial images is presented by combining the detecting technique of steganalysis and correlation attack of cryptanalysis together. The analysis for this method and experimental results on steganographic software "Hide and Seek 4.1" are both accordant with the information-theoretic conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Steganography is an important branch of information hiding, and it is about how to send secret message covertly. The attacks to steganography (i.e. steganalysis) mainly include passive attack, active attack, and extracting attack. A passive attacker only wants to detect the existence of the embedded message, while an active attacker wants to destroy it. The purpose of an extracting attacker is to obtain the message embedded into the innocent data. So there are three kinds of security for different attacks respectively, i.e. detectability, robustness and difficulty of extraction.
The theoretic study about steganography has always been concerning the detectability, and there have been many literatures that model the detectability with information-theoretic method or in the terms of computational complexity [1] - [4] . On the other hand, references [5] - [7] think of the information hiding problem with active attackers as a "capacity game", and define the robustness using the "hiding capcity". Although robustness is mainly concerned in watermarking problem, it, as the measure of efficiency, is also important for steganography. And references [8] - [11] analyze the relation between the detectability and robustness.
Similar with the theoretic field, the study about actual steganalysis has also being centering on detecting technique. And there have been many detecting methods for a variety of steganographic algorithms such as [12] - [14] . However, there are only a few papers about extracting attack. Chandramouli [15] studies how to make extracting attack on spread spectrum steganography for a special scenario in which the same message is sent twice in the same image with different strength factors. Fridrich et al. [16] show how to get the hidden message through recovering the key of LSB steganography on JPEG images such as "F5 [17] and Outguess [18] ". And recently in [19] Fridrich et al. extent their approach to spatial domain. Another extracting approach to LSB steganography on JPEG images is presented by Ma et al. [20] .
The extracting attack on steganography can be viewed as a special kind of cryptanalysis. In fact for most of steganographic systems the message is required to be encrypted before it is hidden. Therefore, when facing the model of "encrytion+hiding", a cryptanalyst has to analyze a "multiple cipher". Fridrich et al. [16] analyze the complexity of searching stego-key: If there is some recognizable structure in the steganographic communication, one can use it as a sign to searching the key by dictionary attack or brute-force search; otherwise, searching process should try all encryption keys for every possible stego-key, so the complexity of brute-force search becomes proportional to the product of the number of stego and crypto keys. That means that the extraction and decipher should be done together. Obviously a cryptanalyst hope that the two tasks can be finished independently. And the extracting attack just solve the problem how to extract the embedded sequence without regard to encryption algorithm.
In this paper, the difficulty of extraction, which is essentially a kind of privacy, is studied with information-theoretic method in the terms of unicity distance of stego key. Unicity distance is just the minimum number of data needed by the attacker to recover the stego key, which can exactly grasp the concept on "difficulty of extraction" for key based stegonography. The relations between key rate, message rate, hiding capacity and unicity distance are analyzed. And it is proved that unicity distance is directly proportional to the entropy of stegokey, and inversely proportional to "hiding redundancy" which is the difference between the hiding capacity and message rate.
As mentioned above, our conclusion comes from the basic idea that extracting attack on steganography is a special kind of steganalysis. Therefore this problem can be solved by combining traditional techniques of cryptanalysis and steganalysis together. As an example, we present an extracting approach on random LSB replacing steganography of spatial images, which is based on some detecting techniques in steganalysis and the idea of correlation attack [21] in cryptanalysis. One contribution of our attack is that it can accurately estimate the amount of necessary data. With this method, we make a successful extracting attack on steganographic software "Hide and Seek 4.1" [22] which is found in the United States recently [23] . Experimental results on "Hide and Seek 4.1" are accordant with the analysis for our extracting algorithm, which also verify the validity of the information-theoretic conclusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The main theorem on unicity distance of stego key is given in Sect. II. And in Sect. III a method of recovering stego key -"correlation attack" -on LSB replacing steganography of spatial images is presented. The experimental results on attacking "Hide and Seek 4.1" is given in Sect. IV. And the paper concludes with a discussion in Sect. V.
II. INFORMATION-THEORETIC ANALYSIS FOR THE UNICITY DISTANCE OF STEGO KEY A. Notations and Definitions
For the information-theoretic analysis, we use the following notations. Random variables are denoted by capital letters (e.g. X), and their realizations by respective lower case letters (e.g. x). The domains over that random variables are defined are denoted by script letters (e.g. X ). Sequences of N random variables are denoted with a superscript (e.g. X N = (X1, X2, · · · , XN ) which takes its values on the product set X N ). And we denote entropy and conditional entropy with H(·) and H(·|·) respectively.
A general model of a stegosystem can be described as follows. The embedded data M is hidden in an innocuous data X, usually named cover object, in the control of a secret stego key K, producing the stego object X. The stego key is shared between the sender and receiver but is secret for the third party. And the receiver can extract M from X with the stego key K. An extracting attacker wants to recover the embedded message or the stego key through the stego object (Maybe he can use some side information, for example part knowledge about the cover object).
Assume that the cover object data is a sequence X N = ( X1, X2, · · · , XN ) of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) samples from P ( x). Because the embedded message usually is cipher text, we assume that it is a sequence M N = (M1, M2, · · · , MN ) of independent and uniformly distributed, and independent of X N . The stego key K is independent of the message and cover object.
Now we describe a formal definition of steganographic code which is introduced by Moulin et al. [7] , [24] . First of all, the embedding algorithm of a stegosystem should keep transparency that can be guaranteed by some distortion constraint. A distortion function is a nonnegative function d : X ×X → R + ∪{0}, which can be extended to one on N-tuples by
Definition 1: [7] A length-N steganographic code subject to distortion D is a triple (M, fN , φN ) , where
• M is the message set of cardinality |M|;
N is the embedding algorithm mapping a sequence x N , a message m and a key k to a sequence
This mapping is subject to the distortion constraint
• φN : X N × K N → M is the extracting algorithm mapping the received sequence x N with the key k to a decoded message
A cover channel is a conditional p.m.f. (probability mass function) q(x| x) : X → X . The compound cover channel subject to distortion D is the set Q = {q(x| x) :
The length-N memoryless extension of the channel is the conditional p.m.f.
For a length-N steganographic code, define the message rate and key rate as
respectively. And define the probability of error as PeN = P (φN (X N , K) = M ). The hiding capacity is the supremum of all achieve message rates of steganographic codes subject to distortion D under the condition of zero probability of error (i.e. Pe,N → 0 as N → ∞).
Because we disregard the active attacker and assume that K is independent of M and X, the results of [7] , [24] imply that the expression of hiding capacity for steganographic code can be given by
Because C(D) is the maximum of the conditional entropy through all cover channels subject to D distortion, C(D) just reflects the hiding ability of the cover-object within the distortion constraint. So we refer to C(D) − Rm as the hiding redundancy, which can reflect the hiding capability of the steganographic code.
B. Unicity Distance of Stego-key
According to the Kerckhoff's principle, the security of a steganographic code should be based on nothing but the secrecy of the stego key. Therefore, it is important to analyze the key equivocation. In details, we want to know how many data the attacker must used to recover the stego key, i.e. the unicity distance of stego key. We analyze this problem according to two kinds of attacking conditions. One is stego-only extracting attack, i.e. the attacker can only get the stego objects; the other is known-cover extracting attack that means that the attacker can get not only the stego objects but also some corresponding cover objects. And we begin the analysis with knowncover attack.
Theorem 1: (M, fN , φN ) is length-N steganographic code subject to distortion D with zero probability of error, i.e. for any given
Then for given sequence of n (n is large enough) pairs of cover objects and stego objects, the expectation of spurious stego keys Sn for known-cover extracting attack has the lower bound such that
where
H(X| X) is the hiding capacity and Rm =
is the message rate.
Proof: For a given sequence of pairs of cover objects and stego objects ( x N , x N ) n , the set of possible stego keys is defined as
So the number of spurious stego keys for observed (
, and the expectation of spurious stego keys is given by
Using Jesen's inequality, we can get
On the other hand, f
, which, together with the assumption that key is independent of message and cover object, message is independent of cover object, and the sequences X Nn and M n are both i.i.d. sequence of random variables, yields that
Since the steganographic code satisfies zero probability of error, we have, for any given ε > 0,
Equation (4) with Fano's inequality implies that for any given ε > 0,
Furthermore, because sequence X Nn is i.i.d. sequence of random variables and cover channel is memoryless, we obtain that
combining (3) and (6) yields that, for any given ε > 0,
which, together with (2), implies for any given ε > 0,
Since hiding capacity C(D) satisfies C(D) = max q(x| x)∈Q H(X| X) and
, we have, for any given ε > 0,
Definition 2: The unicity distance n0 for a steganographic code with known-cover extracting attackers is the minimum number of pairs of cover objects and stego objects with which one expects that the expectation of spurious stego keys equals zero. And the unicity distance n1 for a steganographic code with stego-only extracting attackers is the minimum number of stego objects with which one expects that the expectation of spurious stego keys equals zero.
It is easy to know that n1 ≥ n0 . And using Theorem 1, we can get the following important corollary.
Corollary 2: The unicity distance n0 for known-cover extracting attack and n1 for stego-only extracting attack satisfy that for any given ε > 0,
is the message rate and
is the key rate.
Corollary 2 shows that larger key rate R k and smaller hiding redundancy C(D) − Rm can make stronger difficulty of extraction. The former is clear, while, for the latter, we give an intuitive explanation as follows. Smaller hiding redundancy means a message rate more appropriate for the cover channel. In this case, dealing with the stego-objects (such as sampling) with correct and spurious key respectively can only bring small differences. In other words, it is difficult for the extracting attacker to distinguish between the correct key and spurious ones.
C. The Analysis for LSB Steganography
As an example, we use the results in preceding subsection to analyze the most popular steganographic mechanism, i.e. random LSB steganoraphy on images, such as F5 [17] , Outguess [18] and "Hide and Seek" [22] .
LSB replacing steganography usually work in the following manner: Firstly, select an image with N DCT coefficients for JPEG images (or N pixels for spatial images) denoted by C = (c1, · · · , cN ). Then randomly pick a subset of pixels, {cj 1 , · · · , cj L }, using a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) which is seeded with a stego-key k belonging to the key space K, i.e. the PRNG with k generates a embedding path {j1, · · · , jL}. Finally, embedding the message sequence M = (m1, · · · , mL), where mi ∈ {0, 1}, by replacing the LSBs of {cj 1 , · · · , cj L } or other embedding operations such as ±1 to the DCT coefficients (or pixels), and generate the stegoimage S = (s1, · · · , sN ). Two kinds of embedding operations are shown in Table I and Table II respectively. The embedding rate r is defined as the ratio of the length of message to that of image, i.e. r = L N . which means that the possibility of a DCT coefficient (or pixel) being selected to carry one bit message is r, because the message is asked to randomly scattered in the whole image. Since message sequence M is usually cipher text, we assume that M is uniformly distributed and independent with C, therefore every pixel is modified with probability r 2
. In fact LSBs of images are similar to noise data and then approximately is uniformly distributed and independent with M , so the assumption of modifying rate being r 2 is also reasonable for plain text M . When using Corollary 2, we have to compute the hiding capacity that is hard generally. However, if the cover-objects are binary sequence satisfying distribution of Bernoulli ( 1 2 ) and the distortion metric is Hamming metric, hiding capacity is given in [24] . The capacity is where
To analyze the LSB steganography, for simple we take the LSBs of the DCT coefficients (or pixels) as cover-objects, which satisfies distribution of Bernoulli( 
. Therefore (9) implies the hiding capacity is H( r 2 ), and the hiding redundancy is H( r 2 ) − r. In Fig.1 , it is clear that when r → 0 (or r → 1), the redundancy of cover channel H r 2 − r → 0, with which Corollary 2 implies that the unicity of the stego key tends to infinity, i.e. it is hard for the attack to succeed.
III. EXTRACTING ATTACK ON LSB REPLACING STEGANOGRAPHY OF SPATIAL IMAGES
Reference [16] presents an extracting attack on LSB steganography of JPEG images (such as F5 and Outguess), and [19] make an extracting attack on LSB (replacing or ±1) steganography of spatial images. The purposes of these attacks are both to recovery the stegokey, and the experimental results show the same phenomena that the attacking processes need more data for small or large embedding rate r, and when r → 0 (or r → 1) the attacks will fail, which consists with the information-theoretic conclusion in Sect. II. However, on the other hand, it should be noted that the analysis in Sect. II is based on some general assumptions and the lower bound in corollary 2 is obtained from known-cover attack although it is also a lower bound for stego-only attack. Therefore the results of preceding section can only reflect the tendency of the difficulty of recovering stego key but can not be used to estimate the amount of needed data by the attacker. And the methods of [16] and [19] are both based on non-parameter hypothesis testing, by which it is hard to calculate the necessary amount of samples. Now we present a new stego key searching method for LSB replacing steganography of spatial images by using a parameter hypothesis testing, which is efficient and simpler than preceding methods. The main contribution of our attack is that it can accurately estimate the amount of necessary data, which is important because with less data we cannot get the stego key while too much data will slow down the searching speed.
Our method is also an example about how to do extracting attack by combining traditional techniques of cryptanalysis and steganalysis together. The main ideas are as follows. Firstly estimate the length of the message (the embedding rate) with some detecting methods. And then filter the stego image to get the data of its noise area that can be thought of as a sample from a mixture distribution [25] with the mixing parameter as a function of the embedding rate. Through analyzing this mixture distribution, we can exploit some "accordant advantage" of the correct stego key over those spurious ones. Finally, with this accordant advantage, do the correlation attack as cryptanalysis to obtain the stego key.
We do extracting attack under the assumption that we get a stego image and know the steganographic algorithm. And the only thing we don't know is just the stego key. This assumption is similar with that in cryptanalysis. And in this paper, 8 bits grayscale images is taken as examples to describe our method. And the same notations as those in Sect. II (C) will be used. In details, denote the cover image and stego image with N pixels by C = (c1, · · · , cN ) and S = (s1, · · · , sN ) respectively, where ci, si ∈ [0, 255] and 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The stego key k, belonging to the key space K, is just the seed of the PRNG. The message sequence is denoted by M = (m1, · · · , mL). Notice that, as mentioned in Sect. I, message is usually required to be encrypted before it is embedded into images, which is why recovering stego key with simple brute-force search has to consider the encryption key at the same time. And the purpose of our method is to get the stego key k regardless of encryption key when getting only the stego image S.
A. A mixture distribution model of stego images' noise
LSB steganography essentially hides the message in the noise area of the image. Therefore we analyze the noise data of the stego image. Firstly filter the stego image S = (s1, · · · , sN ) with spatial average filter, and get a"new image"S = {s1,s2, · · · ,sN }. Note that here savesi's as real numbers, i.e. keep several digits of decimal fraction when averaging pixels. Then take difference between the pixels of S andS as the noise data. For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , if si is odd, the noise data is defined as wi = si −si, and if si is even wi =si − si. The set of noise data is denoted by W = {w1, w2, · · · , wN }.
It is reasonable to assume that the noise data wi's corresponding to si's, which have not been modified, is a sample from a Gaussian White Noise approximately, i.e. a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ 2 . And if the pixel si in ith position has been modified in embedding process, 1 has been added to ci when si is odd, and 1 has been subtract from ci when si is even as shown in Table  I . Therefore wi's corresponding to modified si's can be viewed as a sample from a normal distribution with mean 1 and the same variation σ 2 . Here we ignore the influence of modifying pixels around the position i, because this kind of influence is counteracted by averaging them. Both of the two assumptions have been verified by experimental results on many images. When embedding rate is r , in S on average r 2 of pixels have been modified. So W = {w1, w2, · · · , wN } is a sample from a mixture distribution
where F (x) and G(x) are the distribution functions of normal distribution N (0, σ 2 ) and N (1, σ 2 ) respectively.
For k ∈ K, let I(k) denote the set of sample indices visited along the path generated from the key k. If k is a spurious key, {wj } j∈I(k) is a random sample from distribution (10) . On the other hand, if k is just the correct key k0, in {wj } j∈I(k 0 ) on average 50% of samples are from distribution F (x) and the other 50% of them from the distribution G(x). So in this case, {wj } j∈I(k 0 ) is a random sample from mixture distribution such as
When 0 < r < 1, the difference between distributions (10) and (11) can be used to distinguish the correct key from those spurious ones.
B. Accordant Advantage
To exploit the difference between mixture distributions (10) and (11), let X0 be a random variable with distribution function F (x), X1 is a random variable with distribution function G(x), α0 = P {X0 > A}, and α1 = P {X1 > A}, where A is a real number larger than zero. Then
Write ∆α = α1 − α0. It is easy to be proved that ∆α > 0.
As mentioned above, for the correct key k0, the sample of noise data set {wj } j∈I(k 0 ) can be modeled as the realizations of a random variable Y0 whose distribution function is (11), while for an incorrect key k, sample {wj } j∈I(k) can be viewed as the realizations of a random variable Y1 whose distribution function is (10) . Let p0 = P (Y0 > A) and p1 = P (Y1 > A), then
And then the difference between them is that
When the embedding rate r being less than 1, ∆p > 0 because ∆α > 0. That implies the correct key can sample large noise data with lager possibility than a spurious key does. Call ∆p as the "accordant advantage". When ∆p being large enough, we can recover the correct key. Given the r, ∆p is determined by ∆α, therefore we hope to take the proper A to get the largest ∆α. Define function
Then α0 = Q(
). And when
, ∆α is largest. In this case,
) .
To compute the values of p0 and p1, we need also estimate the variation σ 2 . Denote the second moment of sample W asā2, i.e.
Notice that W is the sample from distribution (10), therefore the result in [25] implies thatā2
And we take statistic (19) as the estimation of σ 2 .
C. Correlation Attack
In this section, we borrow the idea of correlation attack in cryptanalysis to recover the stego key with the accordant advantage ∆p. For k ∈ K the set of indices generated from the key k is denoted as I(k) = {j1, j2, · · · , jL}. And the corresponding sample from noise set W obtained with k is {wj 1 , wj 2 , · · · , wj L } which can be viewed as a sequence of i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) random variables. Define a new sequence of random variables as
Therefore
Zi where 1 ≤ n ≤ L. For the correct key k0, the analysis in Sect. III (B) shows that P {Zi = 1} = p0 , and the Central Limit Theorem implies that the distribution of ηn is approximately equal to the normal distribution N (np0, np0(1 − p0)) when n is large enough. Similarly, on the other hand, for an incorrect key k, the distribution of ηn is approximately equal to normal distribution N (np1, np1(1 − p1)) when n is large enough. Then the work of searching the correct key can be formulated as the following hypothesis testing problem: np0(1 − p0) ) which means k is just the correct key k0; H1: ηn ∼ N (np1, np1(1 − p1)) which means k is an incorrect key. Select a threshold T . If ηn ≥ T , accept H0, otherwise accept H1.
Generally larger number of samples n we use, more accurate decision we can do. However, larger n means spending more searching time. We should determine n and the threshold T so as to achieve the proper probability of the false alarm event p f and that of missing event pm. Using (17), we obtain that
In the present problem, we mainly concern p f . When the number of all possible stego keys is |K|, p f is picked as small as 1 2 |K| so that the correct key can be determined uniquely. And pm could be chosen close to zero (for example 10 −2 ). For given p f and pm, search the Table for Standard Normal Distribution Function to get w f and wm such that (20), we can compute the needed values of n and T as follows:
Note that to get n samples of noise data, n * (n * ≈ n r ) pixels are needed on average. So combining (16) and (21), we can get an estimation for the number of needed pixels n * such as
Equation (23) shows that n * → ∞ as r → 0 or 1. In other words, when the embedding rate r is very small (close to 0) or very large (close to 1), the process of recovering stego key will become difficult because we have not enough pixels to use. Notice that this is accordant with the information-theoretic analysis in Sect.II. And this conclusion will also be proved by he experimental results on "Hide and Seek 4.1" in next section.
With preparations above, now we describe the attacking method. Assume that we have detect a stego image S with N pixels, and know details of the steganographic algorithm except the stego key. The attacking procedure goes through the following steps.
Algorithm -Correlation Attack
Step 0 1) Estimate embedded message length L and the embedding rate r (r = L N ) using the method in [26] ; 2) Filter the stego image S and take the noise data set W = {w1, , w2, · · · , wN } as described in Sect. III (A);
3) Estimate the variance σ 2 with statistic (19) . Let A = 0.5, and compute p0 and p1 by using equations (12), (13) , (14) and (15); 4) Let p f = 1 2 |K| , choose a proper pm (for example 10 −2 ), and pick the w f and wm such that 1 2 |K| = Q(w f ), and pm = Q(wm). Finally compute the necessary number of samples n and the threshold T using (21) and (22) .
Step 1 If n > L , go to Step 3; otherwise, test all stego keys in K: for every k ∈ K, seed the PRNG with k to generate the set containing n sample indices I(k) = {j1, j2, · · · , jn} and extract n samples of noise data {wj 1 , wj 2 , · · · , wj n }. Then count the number T k of wj i 's such that wj i > 0.5,
Step 2 If |B| = 1, then then take the only key in B as the correct key and stop; If |B| = 0 or |B| > 1 go to Step 3;
Step 3 Let n = L. Test all keys in K as does in step 1 and obtain T k for every k ∈ K. Write Tmax = max k∈K {T k }, and
Step 4 If |D| = 1, then take the only key in D as the correct key and stop; If |D| > 1, the attack fails and stop.
IV. EXTRACTING ATTACK ON "HIDE AND SEEK 4.1"
As an example, we use our method to recover the stego key of "Hide and Seek 4.1" [22] which is a typical LSB replacing steganographic algorithm on the GIF file with 256 shades of gray or color (In fact the deviser of "Hide and Seek" suggest that greyscale is best by far). The PRNG, used in "Hide and Seek" to generate the embedding path, is based on the function "random ( )" of "Borland C++3.1", which is seeded by a seed of 16 bits and the length of message together. Hiding program encrypts the header information, which consists of the 16 bits seed, length of message and number of version, with IDEA cipher to produce 64 bits cipher texts and embeds them into the LSBs of the first 64 pixels of the GIF file. The key of IDEA is generated by a password consisting of not more than 8 characters (64 bits). Therefore the receiver, who knows the password, can decipher the hider information to get the seed and length of message, which will seed the PRNG to extract the hidden message.
It is hard to recover the 64 bits key of IDEA, but we can skip the first 64 pixels and recover the key of PRNG with "Correlation Attack" directly. "Hide and Seek 4.1" uses only GIF images with 320 × 480 pixels, so the maximum length of message is defined as 19000 bytes. 1 And the approach of [26] can estimate the embedding rate with error between ±0.02, therefore mostly about 760 (19000 × 0.04) possible lengths need to be tested when searching for the key. In other words, the cardinality of the key space we search is 2 16 ×760, i.e. the length of virtual key is only about 26 bits (16 + log 2 760 ≈ 25.57).
We do the experiment on 40 GIF files with 256-greyscale for several kinds of embedding rates. And the correct key can be determined when embedding rate r satisfies 5.3% < r < 94.7%. However, because the image used by "Hide and Seek" is small (only 320 × 480 pixels), for |K| = 2 16 × 760, the number of needed samples n usually is larger than L, the algorithm has to do the Step 3. To test the estimations for n and T with (21) and (22), we also do the experiment under the assumption that the length of message being known, which means the key is only the 16 bits of seed. In this case, for r such that 1.1% < r < 98.4%, we can get the correct key successfully. Plain text and cipher text are embedded respectively with "Hide and Seek 4.1" for the experiments and the attacking results are similar. These Experiments are achieved on Pentium IV machines running at 2.4GHz, 512MB RAM, and there is a search rate of 250-8400 keys per second. The search speed is greatly influenced by the embedding rate.
The detailed results of experiments on lena.gif and peppers.gif, when key is only the 16 bits of seed, list Table III and Table  IV respectively. In the tables, "-" means that estimated number of samples n is larger than the length of message L, and the attack will do Step 3; T k 0 with "*" is smaller than threshold T and |B| is zero, therefore the attack also will do the Step 3. It is shown that, when r satisfying 10.5% < r < 52.6% (i.e. 200 ≤ L ≤ 9000), the necessary number of samples n is smaller than the length of message L, and the attacking procedure can stop successfully in step 2. In this case, there is searching speed increase of 10% − 45% than that of setting n = L directly, and note that the T k 0 is larger than but close to the threshold T , which implies that the necessary number of samples n and the threshold T obtained with (21) and (22) are accurate.
And on the whole the attacking processes need more data for smaller or larger embedding rate r, and when r → 0 (or r → 1) attacks will fail, which verifies the information-theoretic conclusion in Sect. II once more. In the field of steganalysis, so far there have been many literatures about detecting attack while there are few about extracting attack. But the latter also will be concerned greatly because it is a problem that a cryptanalyst has to face. In this paper, we make a preliminary analysis on this problem using information-theoretic method that is an analogue of Shannon's for cryptography [27] . And the results can give some general idea about the extracting attack no steganogrphy.
Our basic idea is that the extracting attack is in principle a kind of cryptanalysis, and it should rely on both steganalysis and cryptanalysis. As an example, we present an effective extracting method no popular LSB replacing steganography of spatial images by using the detecting technique of steganalysis and correlation attacking technique of cryptanalysis together. The analysis for our extracting method and the experimental results on "Hide and Seek 4.1" are both accordant with the information-theoretic conclusion.
Better lower bounds on unicity of stego key for stgeo-only attack and attacks under other conditions are interesting problems that we will study. And our further work will also include exploiting extracting approaches on other kinds of steganographic algorithms. 
